TriOngle

AG1Assure AI agent scope

MCP server and tool-chain audit

A close audit of the MCP servers and tools your agents use: how they authorise, what they can reach, how they install, and whether their descriptions can be turned against you.

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What it is for

The Model Context Protocol connects agents to tools and data. Each MCP server is code with access to something you care about, and each one is a door. AG1 inspects the doors.

What we look at

  • Inventory: every server in use, local and remote, who published it, which version, and who approved it.
  • Authorization: the MCP authorization specification builds on OAuth 2.1 and requires servers to publish OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728) and to accept only tokens issued for them.⁠[1][2] We check audience validation, token passthrough, client registration and scope design.
  • Known attack classes: confused deputy, token passthrough, server-side request forgery during OAuth discovery, state handle hijacking, local server compromise through startup commands, and over-broad scopes, each with the mitigations the best practices give.⁠[3]
  • Tool poisoning: whether a tool’s description or output can carry instructions your agent will follow. The specification treats tool annotations as untrusted unless the server is trusted.⁠[4]
  • Installation: how servers are installed and updated. In September 2025 a malicious package impersonating a legitimate MCP server quietly copied every email sent through it to an attacker.⁠[5]

What you receive

A server inventory with a verdict on each, an authorization review, the results of SSRF, installation and tool-poisoning tests, and findings mapped under the TriOngle Method.

Framework mapping

The frameworks this scope is aligned with, the version we map to, and what we map. Aligned with means we use the framework; it does not mean any body has certified TriOngle.

FrameworkVersionWhat we map
MCP specification and Security Best PracticesSpecification 2026-07-28⁠[4]⁠[3]Every attack and mitigation in the security best practices
MCP AuthorizationSpecification 2026-07-28⁠[1]OAuth 2.1, protected resource metadata, resource indicators
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications2026 edition, 9 Dec 2025⁠[6]ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation; ASI04 Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
OWASP MCP Top 10Beta⁠[7]MCP01 to MCP10
CoSAI Model Context Protocol security taxonomy27 Jan 2026⁠[8]Threat categories in the taxonomy

References

Numbered in the order they are first cited on this page; each entry links back to the places that cite it. Every source was opened on 4 November 2026.

  1. ↑ a b Authorization. Model Context Protocol.
  2. ↑ RFC 9728: OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata. RFC Editor, April 2025.
  3. ↑ a b Security Best Practices. Model Context Protocol.
  4. ↑ a b Model Context Protocol: Specification. modelcontextprotocol.io. Schema version 2026-07-28.
  5. ↑ First Malicious MCP Server Found Stealing Emails in Rogue Postmark-MCP Package. The Hacker News, 29 September 2025.
  6. ↑ OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications for 2026. OWASP Gen AI Security Project, 9 December 2025.
  7. ↑ OWASP MCP Top 10. OWASP Foundation. Beta release.
  8. ↑ Coalition for Secure AI Releases Extensive Taxonomy for Model Context Protocol Security. OASIS Open, 27 January 2026.